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Israeli Foreign Policy in Historical Perspective: State, Ethno Nationalism, Globalization 
 















This paper suggests a new approach to examine periods in Israel’s foreign policy from 1948 
to the present, which uses the concepts of state, ethno nationalism and globalization, as 
analytical tools. I argue that Israeli foreign policy encompasses three major periods: statist 
(1948-1973), ethno nationalist and statist (1973-1985), and globalization, ethno nationalism 
and declining statism, (1985-present). Of course, the analytical concepts of state, ethno 
nationalism and globalization cannot explain every decision and action in Israel’s foreign 
policy since 1948. However, these concepts can be considered ideal types that capture the 
salient trends in Israel’s foreign policy in relation to three issues: composition of the domestic 
arena; social make-up of the foreign policy elite; and the conflicting approaches that shape 
the conduct of Israel’s foreign affairs. Israel’s external environment is conspicuously absent 
not because I see it as unimportant, but because the underlying assumption in this paper is 
that the effects produced by changes in the external environment depend on how domestic 
actors interpret and comprehend them. Therefore, this paper is informed by an emphasis on 
innenpolitik, understood to be the primacy of domestic factors in explaining foreign policy.  
 
In examining Israel’s foreign policy this paper tries also to account for change. Drawing on 
Krassner and others, the account is informed by the assumption that there is an intimate link 
between crisis and institutional change.1 Two crises are considered significant for explaining 
changes in Israeli foreign policy: the 1973 Yom Kippur war and its aftermath, and the 
economic crisis that resulted in the Economic Emergency Stability Plan (EESP) being 
 
1 Stephen D. Krasner, ‘Approaches to the State: Alternative Conceptions and Historical 
Dynamics’, in Comparative Politics, 16(2), (1984), 223-46.  
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adopted in 1985. The framework proposed is used to prompt some reflections upon the 
linkage between trends in Israeli foreign policy and its covert diplomacy.   
 
Contrasting approaches to Israeli foreign policy 
The framework proposed to explain continuity and change in Israeli foreign policy since 
1948 is situated in relation to three alternative analytical approaches. The regional approach, 
which explains Israel’s foreign policy in terms of the political and military make-up of the 
Middle East, comprises two strands. Some, e.g., Inbar, emphasize the unremitting hostility of 
the Middle East towards the very idea of Israel’s existence. It is argued that this compelled 
Israel to predicate its foreign policy on military force and subordinate it to its defence 
requirements. In this approach realisation by the Arab states—Egypt and Jordan—and the 
Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) that Israel could not be eradicated by force, 
enabled a reformulation of Israeli foreign policy vis-à-vis these entities.2 However, the 
regional approach has also produced studies of a different nature. While conceiving of the 
military and political make-up of the Middle East as the key determinant of Israel’s foreign 
policy, scholars, like Morris, see the impact as more complex. Whilst they acknowledge that 
the Middle East’s political and military make-up presents Israel with formidable challenges, 
they conceive of Israeli foreign policy as having more latitude than scholars such as Inbar 
 
2 E.g., Efriam Inbar, ‘Arab-Israeli Coexistence: The Causes, Achievements and Limitations’, 




would concede. In these accounts Israel’s foreign policy is seen as a mixed bag of successes 
and missed opportunities.3 
 
The second approach explains Israel’s foreign policy in terms of domestic factors. The key 
players identified include the political parties - especially Alignment and Likud,4 the settler 
movement,5 and the Israeli Defence Force (IDF).6 They argue that each of these actors, to 
varying degrees, manipulated Israeli foreign policy and its implementation. Explaining Israeli 
foreign policy in terms of a Zionist ideology or identity constitutes the third approach.7 The 
most cogent account in this strand is Avi Shlaim’s work. It explains Israel’s foreign policy in 
terms of Ze’ev Jabotinsky’s doctrine of the iron wall, which advocated the erection of an iron 
 
3 Benny Morris, Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881-2001(New-
York: Vintage Books, 2001).    
4E.g., Efraim Inbar, War and Peace in Israeli Politics: Labour Party Positions on National 
Security (London: Lynne Rienner, 1991); Ilan Peleg, Begin’s Foreign Policy, 1977-1983: 
Israel’s Move to the Right (New York, NY: Greenwood Press, 1987).    
5 Ian S. Lustik, For Land and Lord (New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 
1994); Akiva Eldar and Idit Zartal, The Lords of the Land: The Settlers and the State of Israel 
1967-2004 (Or Yehuda: Kineret-Zmora-Bitan, 2005). 
6E.g., Yoram Peri, Between Battles and Ballots: Israeli Military in Politics (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1983); Yagil Levy, The Other Army of Israel: Materialist 
Militarism in Israel (Tel-Aviv: Yediot Achronot, 2003) (in Hebrew); Oren Barak and Gabriel 
Sheffer, ‘Israel’s Security Network: An Exploration of a New Approach’, in International 
Journal of Middle East Studies, 38, (2006), 235-261.   
7 Avi Shlaim, The Iron Wall (London: Penguin, 2000).  
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wall of Jewish military force against the perceived implacable Arab hostility to the Zionist 
project. Shlaim and his followers offer a ‘revisionist interpretation of Israel’s foreign policy 
towards the Arab world during the first fifty years following statehood’.8 They argue that 
establishment of military force and its deployment has become an Israeli foreign policy end, 
which differs contrasts with Jabotinky’s doctrine of attaining military supremacy as a means 
for enabling political engagement with the Arab side and an end to conflict.  
 
Statist period 
In what follows I examine Israeli foreign policy from 1948 to the present in terms of the state, 
ethno nationalism, globalization and crises. The concept of the state in this paper derives 
from what could be termed a neo-Weberian institutional approach in which the state is seen 
as ‘a set of administrative, policing and military organisations headed, and more or less well 
coordinated, by an executive authority’.9 In this formulation the state is an ‘actual 
organization’ possessing relative autonomy and the capacity to act in the internal and external 
spheres. The state’s relative autonomy in both contexts derives from its unique positioning to 
deal with the exigencies imposed by international security competition, an ongoing need to 
extract finance, e.g., via taxation, to fund its endeavours, and its capacity for surveillance. 
States use surveillance of civil society to both pacify and mobilize its resources. The state-
civil society relationship is one of competition in which the state has relative autonomy.10  
 
 
8 Shlaim, The Iron Wall, xvi and 14.  
9 Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions: A comparative analysis of France, Russia 
and China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979 ), 29.  
10 Halliday, The Middle East in International Relations,  46. 
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In Israel, the salience of the state in determining foreign policy from 1948 to 1973 was 
reflected and advanced by the predominant ideological edifice of Mamlachtiyut.11 
Mamlachtiyut was developed by Israel’s first Prime Minister, David Ben-Gurion, when he 
was leader of the ruling party Mapai. Mapai led every coalition and owned the premiership 
until it merged with Ahdut Ha-Avoda on the eve of the 1965 elections to form the Labour 
Alignment. Constructing the state around the notion of Mamlachtiyut was a very political act 
that identified the state with Mapai. Ben-Gurion and Mapai used the notion of Mamlachtiyut 
to realign internal politics and de-legitimize political rivals such as Menachem Begin’s Herut 
party.  
 
Mamlachtiyut, however, was more than a product of and part of Ben-Gurion’s and Mapai’s 
political agenda. It portrayed the state as the epitome of Jewish historical revival; it elevated 
the state to a supreme symbol, making it and its institutions the objects of loyalty and 
identification. Mamlachtiyut introduced values and symbols that emphasized state legitimacy 
and the shift from sectoral interests (characteristic of Yishuv) to a collective interest 
(typifying the statist era).12 For instance, the political economy of Israel derived from a 
collectivist ethos highlighting the challenges of arming and defending the country, settling 
the waves of new immigrants, penetrating the frontier regions where Arabs were living or 
 
11 On Mamlachtiyut see, inter alia, Shmuel Sandler, The State of Israel, the Land of Israel: The 
Statist and Ethnonational Dimensions of Foreign policy (London: Greenwood Press, 1993), 
97-98; Charles S. Liebman, and Eliezer Don Yiyheh, Civil Religion in Israel (Berkeley CA: 
University of California Press, 1983), 81-131. 
12 Yoav Peled and Gershon Shafir, ‘The Roots of Peacemaking: The Dynamics of Citizenship 
in Israel, 1948-1993’, International Journal of Middle East Studies 28 (1996): 398.    
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which bordered Arab countries, and developing an economic infrastructure to cope with the 
immigrants and eventually eliminate Israel’s dependence on charity and loans.13  
 
Mamlachtiyut, thus, endowed an aura of supreme political universality of a state with 
interests beyond politics, which rendered competing social and political-bureaucratic actors 
powerless to challenge its authority. The state mobilized the citizenry to serve its goals, 
presented as the common good, through what Lissak terms regimented voluntarism.14 The 
IDF ethos of the warrior (lochem) was the ultimate individual ‘voluntaristic’ act15 above all 
other forms of individual activity in the political, economic, social and cultural spheres. The 
IDF was central in the ideological construct of Mamlachtiyut and its espoused regimented 
voluntarism. Consequently, although the initial development of Mamlachtiyut was geared 
towards consolidating Ben-Gurion’s and Mapai’s power, over time it became associated with 
the institutions of the state at the expense of identification with a political party.  
 
The significance of Mamlachtiyut and the centrality it afforded to the state in relation to 
society, had some important implications for Israel’s foreign policy. First, it left little room 
for societal actors, e.g., political lobby groups, political parties, the media, financial players, 
 
13 Michael Shalev, ‘Liberalization and the Transformation of the Political Economy’, in 
Gershon Shafir and Yoav Peled ,The New Israel (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2000), 130.  
14 Lissak, Moshe, ‘The Ethos of Security and the Myth of Israel as a Militarised Society’ in 
Democratic Culture, 4, 5 (2001): 189 (in Hebrew).  
15 On the ability to portray military service as the ultimate voluntary act, and its roots, see 
Yagil Levy, The Other Army of Israel, 65.  
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to challenge the state, generally or specifically, on foreign policy issues. It was also an 
obstacle to external actors making inroads into Israeli foreign policy. It allowed the state—
especially the IDF and the prime minister’s office—to develop relative autonomy from 
society and the external sphere in formulating and implementing foreign policy.16 Second, as 
Baruch Kimmerling argues, for three decades Israel was led by a distinguishable elite—
Ashkenazi, secular, nationalist men. This elite perceived its duty as presiding over the Zionist 
project.17 Mamlachtiyut encompassed its credo of creating new Jews, Sabras and Warriors, in 
Eretz Israsel, which had the effect of legitimizing the elite’s leadership and expanding the 
already wide space for manoeuvre to conduct Israel’s foreign affairs.  
 
It would be a mistake, however, to regard Israel’s leadership during the statist phase as 
unified. From the early 1950s on, Israel’s foreign policy exhibited rivalry between the activist 
approach represented by David Ben-Gurion, and the non-activists stance represented by 
Moshe Sharett. The activist school was based on the assumptions of Israeli self reliance; 
vigorous and repeated use of military force as the key foreign policy tool; and deep suspicion 
towards the international community. The non-activist school was predisposed to more 
restrained use of military force; greater willingness to rely on diplomacy; and a recognition 
that in the definition of Israel’s foreign policy, the international community was important.18  
 
16 For a theoretical angle on the impact of societal actors on foreign policy see David 
Skidmore and Valerie Hudson, eds., The Limits of State Autonomy: society groups and 
foreign policy formulation (Boulder, CO: Westview 1993).  
17 Baruch Kimmerling, The End of Ashkenazi Hegemony (Jerusalem: Keter, 2001). 
18 Avi Shlaim ‘Conflicting Approaches to Israel’s Relations with the Arabs, Ben Gurion and 
Sharett, 1953-1956’, Middle East Journal, 37 (2), (1983): 180-185. 
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The third effect produced by Mamlachtiyut should be understood against the backdrop of 
these contrasting approaches. The key tenets upon which Mamlachtiyut was predicated, 
especially centrality of the IDF and the ethos of lochem, created a state structure that 
supported domination of the Ben Gurion-led activist approach over Sharett’s non-activist 
stance. This had significant implications for Israel’s foreign policy behaviour during this 
period. For example, the response to infiltrations across the borders from the Gaza Strip and 
Jordan was generally not confined to tit-for-tat raids. Rather, reprisals tended to escalate at 
least one rung, at the expense of exploring diplomatic initiatives.  This dynamic can be seen 
in the events surrounding the Gaza raid, Operation Kineret, and the run up to and outbreak of 
the 1956 war.19 From the perspective in this paper the mutually reinforcing relationship 
between Mamlachtiyut and the activist approach played role in the victory of the activist 
stance. Consequently, the institutions under the control of the activists, e.g., the Prime 
Minister’s office and the IDF, gained greater influence over Israel’s foreign policy-making 
than Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which was dominated by Sharett, the champion of non-
activism.  
 
A number of interesting connections between Israel’s covert diplomacy and the evolution of 
Israeli foreign policy during the statist period might be suggested at this point. First, covert 
diplomacy, like foreign policy-making more broadly, was crafted and implemented within the 
state, which possessed a relative autonomy from its society and the external environment. 
Second, Israel’s covert diplomacy was largely a matter dealt with by the foreign policy elite 
and was informed by the two dominant foreign policy schools of thought: activists and non-
 
19 Avner Yaniv, Deterrence Without the Bomb: The Politics of Israeli Strategy (Washington, 
DC: Lexington Books, 1987): 164-166.  
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activists. Arguably, conducting coercive diplomacy formed part of state capacity and nation 
building in the early formative years of the State of Israel.   
 
The rise of ethno nationalism 
Ethnonationalists do not regard the state as the main political vehicle for organizing the 
community, but rather that a political community derives from what is perceived to be a 
homogenous and descent group. Its members bear the distinct markers of a nation—culture, 
history, language, attachment to a particular territory—which are inscribed into their 
identities. From this perspective, community and state are not seen as separate; the 
community is expressed in and embodied by the state—in this case a Jewish state.20 
 
Ethnonationalism was never wholly absent from Israel’s foreign policy, but at least up to the 
1967 war its impact was secondary to the state factor embodied in Mamlachtiyut. Israel’s 
spectacular military victory in the 1967 war triggered the process that ultimately would shift 
the balance between state and ethnonationalism. The victory provoked an eruption of 
nationalistic feeling in the Israeli Jewish public. It saw it as the return of the Jewish people to 
their biblical cradle: Judea, Samaria, and most notably Jerusalem.21 At the same time, 
 
20 For an overview of ethnonationalism against other expressions of nationalism see Anthony 
D. Smith, Nationalism and Modernism: A Critical Survey of Recent Theories of Nations and 
Nationalism (London: Routledge, 1998): 170-196; for the application of this concept to the 
Israeli case see Gershon Shafir and Yoav Peled, Being Israeli: The Dynamics of Multiple 
Citizenship (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 6.  
21 Morris, Righteous Victims, 311.  
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however, the spectacular performance of the state in the 1967 war reinforced some of the key 
tenets of Mamlachtiyut—centrality of the IDF, the warrior ethos, and the notion of the state 
as a focus for citizens’ loyalty. This hampered the ability of domestic actors to translate the 
eruption of ethnonationalistic sentiment after the 1967 war into a political force that could 
challenge the state.  
 
The conditions favouring a domestic challenge to the state and the centrality of Mamlachtiyut 
were created by the crisis prompted by the 1973 war. This development is in line with the 
link between institutional change and crises described earlier. Although Israel was ultimately 
victorious, the 1973 war as perceived as a massive blunder and resulted in close scrutiny of 
the state and its political-military elite from the public, rival generals and politicians and, 
finally, the government-appointed Agranat commission, which was charged with 
investigating the war.22 The combined effect of the military and economic price to Israel of 
the 1973 war, the public protest against the state, and the overt conflict within the state’s 
military-political circles, severely dented Mamlachtiyut and the leadership it upheld. The 
state was unable to maintain an image of being ‘beyond politics’ or its status as a focus for 
citizen loyalty and regimented voluntarism, which undermined Mamlachtiyut and its statist 
ethos. This is not to argue that Mamlachtiyut and the institutional edifice it supported at 
whose centre was the IDF, became insignificant, but to show that the weakening of 
Mamlachtiyut was a key political development in the process that shifted the balance from the 
state towards ethnonationalism in foreign policy.   
 
 
22 On this aspect of the war see Morris, Righteous Victims, 415-417.  
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Next we explore the implications of this shift in terms of the changes and continuities to the 
three aspects of Israel’s foreign policy examined in the previous section: Israel’s foreign 
policy elite, the domestic actors affecting Israel’s foreign policy, and conflicting approaches 
to the conduct of Israel’s foreign relations. Israel’s foreign policy elite changed from being 
dominated almost exclusively by Ashkenazi, secular, nationalist, males, to an elite bearing 
the imprint of ethnonationalism. This shift can be seen most strongly in the inroads made by 
the Jewish Settler movement to the locus of Israel’s foreign policy-making: the Prime 
Minister’s office and the IDF.23  
 
The concurrent weakening of Mamlachtiyut created the political conditions for societal actors 
other than the Jewish settler movement to exert their influence on Israel’s foreign policy. 
Against this backdrop emerged the Peace Now movement, which levelled a powerful critique 
against Likud’s settlement policy and the 1982 invasion of Lebanon. The movement’s impact 
should be seen not so much in material terms but as an alternative ideational framework to 
that of Likud. For instance, Hermann shows that the two-state paradigm to end the conflict 
with the Palestinians, grew steadily to become the preferred option among the Israeli centre 
left. By presenting this alternative political framework Peace Now made an important 
contribution to the ideational foundations for subsequent negotiation with the PLO.24   
 
We need now to examine the extent of the changes in the approaches to the conduct of 
Israel’s foreign affairs. The 1948-1973 period was characterized by conflict between the 
 
23 For a detailed account of this process see Eldar and Zertal, Lords of the Land, 83-161. 
24 Tamar S. Hermann, The Israeli Peace Movement: A Shattered Dream (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press), 79-108.  
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activist and non-activist stances. Following the 1967 and 1973 wars and the rise of 
ethnonationalism, we see the emergence of the Hawk and Dove approaches. In some respects 
the divide between Hawks and Doves reflects the debate between activists and non-activists, 
e.g. in the disagreement over the balance Israel should strike between diplomacy and use of 
military force to achieve foreign policy goals. The Doves, like the non-activists, wanted more 
active peace initiatives from the Israeli government towards the Arab states. The Hawks, like 
the activists, maintained that military force should continue to be the central Israeli foreign 
policy tool. Following the rise of Likud, which was untainted by the 1973 debacle, 
government enjoyed greater manoeuvrability to apply the Hawkist policy. The use of military 
force to eliminate the potential nuclear threat from Iraq was successful,25 but its use to put in 
place a pro-Israeli Christian government in Lebanon backfired.26  
 
Yet in other respects change was notable, e.g. in the debate over the degree of Israel’s self 
reliance, which perhaps most strongly reflected the enduring (though secondary) influence of 
the state factor. From the vantage point of the state two events during the 1973 war illustrated 
that in the political and military context of the Cold War, Israel no longer had the capacity, 
assumed after the 1967 war, to ‘go it alone’. These events were the US airlift, which enabled 
the Israeli counter-offensive that reversed the course of the war in its favour, and the 
 
25 On the bombing of the Iraqi reactor see Shlomo Nakdimon, First Strike: The Exclusive 
Story of how Israel Foiled Iraq's Attempt to get the Bomb (New-York: Summit Books, 1987.  
26 On the invasion of Lebanon and its aftermath see Zeev Schiff, and Ehud Ya’ari, Israel’s 
Lebanon War (New York, NY: Simon and Shuster, 1984). 
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worldwide alert issued by the US in the final two days of the war, to deter the USSR from 
intervening on the sides of Egypt and Syria.27  
 
Subsequent events illustrate that the activist stance of self reliance was severely eroded. This 
reflected most strongly in the attitude of consecutive Israeli governments—Alignment and 
Likud—to consolidate the relationship with the US.  Consequently, successive memoranda 
were signed between Israel and the US. The first, under Yitzhak Rabin’s leadership, was 
signed in 1975 as part of the Sinai II agreement with Egypt. During the Likud government led 
by Menachem Begin, the memorandum was upgraded as part of the Israeli-Egyptian peace 
agreement. Finally, with Ronald Reagan’s election to the US presidency in November 1980, 
Israel was seen as a ‘formidable strategic asset’28 in the context of the Cold War, and a 
memorandum of understanding on strategic cooperation was signed on 30 November 1981 by 
the two states. This was suspended in December after Israel annexed the Golan Heights, but 
was reactivated in 1983.29 
 
 
27 Yaniv, Deterrence Without the Bomb: The Politics of Israel’s Strategy, 214.   
28 William B. Quandt, Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict 
Since 1967 (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2001), 246.  
29 The 1975 memorandum see Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs web site 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Foreign%20Relations/Israels%20Foreign%20Relations%20sinc
e%201947/1974-1977/112%20Israel-
United%20States%20Memorandum%20of%20Understanding accessed 13/8/07 
For the full text of the 1979 memorandum see 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace%20Process/Guide%20to%20the%20Peace%20Process/U
S-Israel%20Memorandum%20of%20Agreement, accessed 13/8/07.  
15 
 
The significance of these memoranda in the context of this paper lies in both the political, 
military and economic support guaranteed to Israel and in their globalizing effects. 
Previously, Israel could only achieve secondary and tertiary alliances or bonds that ensured a 
continuing and adequate flow of weapons and strategic materials and provided parallel efforts 
that coordinated Israel’s efforts to contain Arab states. Israel’s alliances with France and the 
Kennedy administration exemplify this.30  
 
The deepening strategic relationship with the US after 1973 was more than a mere secondary 
or tertiary alliance. The memoranda effectively embedded Israel into what I have termed 
elsewhere a global cluster of states, built around the Western alliance against the USSR. 
Israel’s military and political incorporation into this global cluster is reflected in its 
agreement to deploy the IDF to missions unrelated to the defence of Israel and the 
description of the USSR in Israeli official documents as a confrontation state.31 Israel, 
therefore, like other states in the global cluster, no longer had exclusive monopoly over use of 
the means of violence. Its state authority and use of legitimate monopoly over the use of 
political force was pooled within the global cluster, at least in terms of use in the external 
sphere. In this respect, the consecutive memoranda had the effect of inducing a process of 
military and political globalization for Israel.  
 
Settlement of the debate over Israel’s self reliance constituted a significant change compared 
to the disagreement between the activists and non-activists on this issue. However, the most 
 
30 On Israel’s secondary and tertiary alliances see Yaniv, Deterrence Without the Bomb, 71-
72, 123-125, and 183-184.  
31 On this latter point see Shlaim, The Iron Wall, 392.  
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significant difference between pre and post 1973 debates on the conduct of foreign policy 
was the disagreement over the significance of territory. The Doves were willing to relinquish 
almost all the territories captured in 1967 in exchange for ‘real peace’ with the Arabs. They 
opposed the assumption of faits accomplis in the territories because it limited future options 
for peace. The most extreme Hawks reflected the rise of ethnonationalism and demanded 
annexation of all the territories captured in the 1967 War. Although this goal was not 
attained, the influence of the Hawkish stance was significant. They were instrumental in 
allowing  government agents and private entrepreneurs to acquire Arab lands in the occupied 
territories to facilitate the de-freezing of their ownership and permit the establishment of 
Jewish settlements in the territories—the first step towards establishment of sovereignty over 
the area.32 This meant that from the Hawkish perspective the land occupied in the 1967 war, 
especially the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, could not be collateral for peace. As a result, 
the ‘territorial’ factor hampered the prospects of realizing Alignment’s preferred option to 
deal with the Palestinians: the Jordanian option. It also impacted on the peace negotiations 
with Egypt resulting in Israel refusing to relinquish its control over the Gaza Strip.  
 
What might the shift from the statist era to the ethno nationalist and statist period have 
entailed as far as Israeli secret diplomacy is concerned? In some respects, e.g., building state 
capacity, the role of Israeli secret diplomacy remained constant in relation to the previous 
period. However, some changes occurred. First, the conduct and implementation of Israeli 
covert diplomacy was informed by the Dove-Hawk rivalry, not the activist non-activist 
debates. Second, because domestic actors had a greater impact than before on foreign policy-
making, there was a greater chance that covert diplomacy would become public knowledge. 
 
32 Baruch Kimmerling, Zionism and Territory (Berkeley CA: University of California Press, 
1983), 154-155.  
17 
 
In fact, in some cases secret diplomacy-made-public knowledge constituted part of the 
political rivalry between the Hawks and the Doves. This was strongly exemplified as the 
public gained insights into Israeli covert diplomacy in Lebanon, particularly from the early 
1980s33 Third, Israeli covert diplomacy had to take into account the US factor to a far greater 
degree than before.  
 
Enter globalization 
Although the term ‘globalization’ has been in academic use since the 1970s, no serious 
attempts were made to theorize it until the late 1980s. By the end of the 1990s the hyper-
globalist, global sceptic and transformationalist theses defined the debate on globalization.34 
More recently, a fourth approach to globalization – the mutually constitutive thesis—has 
been proposed, which includes two critiques of the debate on globalization relevant to this 
paper.35 The first is against the hyper globalist and transformationalist view of globalization 
 
33 On this aspect of Israeli foreign policy see Kirsten E. Schulze, Israel’s Covert Diplomacy 
in Lebanon (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1997).  
34 For the hyper-globalist, transformationalist, and global sceptics classification, David Held 
et al., Global Transformations: Politics, Economics, and Culture (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
1999), 1-29.  
35 The proposed critique is derived from, inter alia, Aran, Israel’s Foreign Policy towards the 
PLO, pp. 2-7; Tarek Barkawi, Globalization and War (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 
2006), pp. 1-59; Ian Clark, Globalization and Fragmentation: International Relations in the 
Twentieth Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997); Ian Clark, Globalization and 
International Relations Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); Martin Shaw, ‘The 
State of Globalization: Towards a Theory of State Transformation’ Review of International 
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solely in terms of economics, technology or the impact of spatio-temporal factors. This 
conception underestimates the role politics and, by extension, foreign policy might play in 
globalization.36 Instead, argues the mutually constitutive thesis, Globalization should be 
considered a multi-centric, multidimensional and dialectical process constituted of political 
and military factors alongside other factors—e.g., economic, technological, ecological, social 
elements. Thus, globalization can be defined as a multi dimensional contested process that 
involves increasing embedding of political, military, economic, social and cultural activities 
in politically unified (quasi)global spheres of activity.37  
 
The second critique is on the globalization-state relationship. Hyperglobalists see the state 
rendered increasingly irrelevant by globalization; transformationalists take the more moderate 
view that it compels states to transform. Thus, hyperglobalist and transformationalist theses 
converge around the assumption that the state is external and counter-positioned to 
contemporary globalization. This conceptualization is rejected by the mutually constitutive 
thesis that conceives of globalization as ‘predicated on and producing state 
 
Political Economy, 4 (3), 1997, pp. 497-513; Martin Shaw, Theory of the Global State: 
Globalization as an Unfinished Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); 
Michael Mann, ‘Has Globalization Ended the Rise and Rise of the Nation-State?’, Review of 
International Political Economy, 4(3) 1997, pp. 472-496; Michael Mann, ‘Globalization and 
September 11’, New Left Review 12, ( 2001): pp. 51-72.   
36 Chris Hill, The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy (London: Palgrave, 2003), 193-194.  
37 I justify this in Amnon Aran, Israel’s Foreign Policy towards the PLO: The Impact of 
Globalization (Sussex: Sussex Academic Press, 2009), 7.  
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transformations’.38 In other words globalization, the state and, by extension, foreign policy, 
are in a mutually constitutive relationship.  
 
I next try to account for the rise of globalization as a vital factor in Israel’s foreign policy 
building on the argument that changes in Israel’s foreign policy are linked closely to crises. 
The rise of globalization is related to the brewing crisis in Israel’s economy since the 1973 
war. The crisis was provoked by the state acting as the central pivot of the economy. This 
resulted in it becoming increasingly indebted to powerful actors in the internal sphere, 
including the burgeoning bureaucratic sector, workers’ committees in the employ of the state, 
and the Histadrut. Economic policy became increasingly undisciplined, allowing excessive 
public sector deficit spending, frequent recourse to corrective devaluations, and government 
lending policies that favoured borrowers over the state. For example, during 1973-1985 
inflation rose to 440% annually; GNP rose by an average 0.81% per annum and from 1981 to 
1986 by only 2%; in 1973 to 1985 the import surplus grew from $1.5 billion to $3.97; and 
state foreign indebtedness rose by a factor of 6 between 1970 and 1986.39 Thus, by 1985, ‘the 
economic crisis had come to pose tangible threats to the state itself—its fundamental 
legitimacy andits economic viability’.40  
 
38 Shaw, ‘The state of globalization’, p. 498. 
39 For data and an account of the economic role military exports played in the context of the 
economic crisis see Stewart Reiser, The Israeli Arms Industry (London: Holmes and Meier, 
1989), 121 and 123.  
40 For a critical evaluation of the magnitude of the crisis from a historical perspective see 




The then Likud-Labour national government responded to this crisis by launching its 
Economic Emergency Stabilisation Plan (EESP), which involved shedding state obligations 
to social groups and economic sectors and devolving responsibility to the market. This wilful 
withdrawal of the state was compounded by measures that embedded various spheres of the 
Israeli economy in global arenas.41 Most significant for this discussion was the globalization 
of trade, finance and capital markets. Before the EESP the private sector was dependent on 
government-allocated credit which, as Shafir and Peled observe, ultimately rendered it ‘for all 
practical purposes another branch of government’.42 However, the globalization of trade and 
finance allowed Israeli businesses to obtain capital from the global economy, greatly 
reducing their dependence on state and government allocated credit.43 Indicatively, ‘the share 
of direct or indirect government loans to the private sector fell from 57.6% to 29.7% in just 
three years, from 1987 to 1990’.44  
 
in Gershon Shafir and Yoav Peled (eds.), The New Israel (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 
2000),132-134.    
41 Shalev, ‘Liberalization and the Transformation of the Political Economy’, p. 148; Emma 
Murphy, ‘Structural Inhibitions to Economic Liberalization in Israel’, Middle East Journal,  
48(1), (1994): 70-71.  
42 Shafir and Peled ‘Introduction’ in, The New Israel, 8.  
43 Gershon Shafir and Yoav Peled, ‘The Globalization of Israeli Business and the Peace 
Process’, in Yoav Peled and Gershon Shafir, The New Israel (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 
2000),  255-256.  
44 Gershon Shafir, ‘Business in Politics: Globalization and the Search for Peace in South 




A large body of research agrees that the EESP was much more than an economic measure; in 
hindsight, it triggered the globalization of Israel’s economy, society and culture.45 The 
implications of this process for Israeli foreign policy-making were profound. Its domestic 
make-up changed as new societal actors encroached on Israel’s foreign policy-making. For 
instance, the vibrant Israeli business community became independent of the state and more 
influential. Businessmen joined the inner circle of the decision-makers, most notably Ariel 
Sharon’s and Ehud Olmert’s.46 The business community had an impact on Israeli policy, e.g., 
supporting the Rabin government during the early years of the Oslo Process and cementing 
relations with the rising powers in Asia: India and China.47  
 
The media also became more influential in Israel’s foreign policy-making. The availability of 
multiple local and global media channels affected Israel’s foreign policy making in a number 
of ways. Israeli national media organizations felt they were losing in the commercial 
competition with the global news corporations that characterized the media landscape and 
 
45Peled and Shafir, The New Israel, Op. Cit. Guy Ben-Porat, Global liberalism, Local 
Populism: Peace and Conflict in Israel/Palestine and Northern Ireland (Syracuse: Syracuse 
University Press, 2006); Uri Ram, The Globalization of Israeli (New York: Routledge, 2008).  
46 Sharon’s close decision-making circle included his son and a group of advisors from the 
business sector:  Dov Wesglass, Lior Horev, Reuven Adler. Olmert’s close circle included 
former businessmen also, e.g., Dr. Yoram Tubovich.   
47 On the impact of business on the peace process see Pen-Porat, Global Liberalism, Local 
Populism, 152-201; on India see, Efraim Inbar, The Israel-India Entente, BESA, 
http://www.biu.ac.il/Besa/Inbar.pdf, accessed 3 May 2011.    
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also the discrepancies between the Israeli and global news coverage was damaging the 
former’s credibility. Therefore, there were demands for a revision of the censorship 
agreements, resulting in new agreements being signed in 1989 and 1996 which progressively 
relaxed the censorship rules. 48  
 
This more open and competitive environment reduced the government’s ability to set the 
agenda for foreign policy debate and promoted media leaks. The risk of a leak affected 
Israel’s decision-making structures. For instance, when testifying to the Winograd 
Commission, Prime Minister Olmert admitted that he had established a forum of seven 
individuals responsible for decision making during war. This structure was set up to avoid 
decisions taken within the forum of the whole government being leaked to the media.49  
Finally, the ability of government to use the IDF as a foreign policy tool was rendered more 
difficult. Although the media still carried patriotic and jingoistic statements about the 
military, these were increasingly complemented by damning reports about the army’s 
activities. The army was portrayed as an inefficient and wasteful, unprofessional 
organization, damaging to civil society, chauvinistic towards female soldiers, and not 
sufficiently alive to the needs of combatants. These reports significantly weakened the social 
and political status of the IDF50 and, by implication, complicated the use of the IDF as a 
foreign policy tool. This was compounded by the growing pervasiveness of images pictures 
 
48Yoram Peri, ‘The changes in the security discourse in the media and the transformations in 
the notion of citizenship in Israel’, in Democratic Culture, 4 (5), (2001). 247-249.    
49 Ehud Olmert, ‘Testimony before the Winograd Commission’, p. 36-38. 
50 Peri, ‘Changes in the Security Discourse in the Media and the Transformations in the 
Notion of Citizenship in Israel, op cit; Levy, The Other Army of Israel, p. 210. 
23 
 
transmitted globally. Almost two decades earlier Shimon Peres had succinctly captured the 
impact of using the military as a foreign policy tool in today’s media environment:  
In contemporary wars, there is no longer a need for Trojan horses because the 
media provides ‘‘real time coverage’’ of wars to every house in ‘‘our global 
village’’. Every one of us therefore has a Trojan horse in their private 
backyard. This may shorten the time that is available for small and medium 
states—which are situated in regions in which world powers have vested 
interests—to use military force. International pressure or military intervention 
will be swiftly employed, in order to put an end to any attempt to destabilize 
the system.51 
  
It would be wrong, however, to think that the domestic make-up of Israel’s foreign policy 
was subsumed to the forces driving Israel’s globalization. In fact, the steady rise of 
ethnonationalism since 1973 proved enduring. From the early 1990s the ongoing impact of 
the Jewish settler movement and Likud was compounded by the emergence of two other 
societal actors: Shas, the Sephardi Ultra Orthodox party, and Israel Our Home, a nationalist 
secularist party. The scope of this paper does not allow in depth examination of the rise of 
these political actors; suffice to say that enabled the Sephardi observing Jews and immigrants 
from the former Soviet Union to produce political representatives from their own ranks.52 The 
Jewish settler movement, Likud, Shas and Israel Our Home comprise an ethno-religious-
nationalist coalition. They have opposed the concessions Israel made towards the PLO and, 
later, the Palestinian Authority (PA). The religious elements of the coalition oppose the 
growing impact of globalization. These groups see globalization as an attack on Jewish 
 
51 Peres, The New Middle East, 53.  
52 On Shas see Yoav Peled (ed.), Shas: The Challenge of Being Israeli (Tel-Aviv: Yediot 
Achronot, 2001); On the immigrants from the former USSR see Moshe Lissak and Elazar 
Leshem (eds.), From Russia to Israel: Culture and Identity in Transition (Tel-Aviv: Ha-
Kibutz Ha Meuchad, 2001) (in Hebrew). 
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tradition, roots and the Jewish character of the state, which could lead to the assimilation of 
Israel into the gentile world.53  
 
The rise of societal actors supporting the globalization of Israel and the enduring importance 
of ethnonationalism raises questions about the degree to which statism remains influential. 
The Israeli state was not rendered uninfluential as a result of global trends on the one hand 
and ethnonationalist-religious trends on the other. Yet these forces certainly eroded the key 
tenets of Mamlachtiyut—collectivism, the warrior ethos, and the status of the state as the 
focus of identification. Thus the impact of the state is currently derived from its unique 
position to deal with the ongoing security challenges faced by Israel—from terrorism to the 
prospect of a nuclear Iran. The ability of the state to deal with these exigencies retains its 
influence, primarily via Israel’s security network.54  
 
The aforementioned trends in the societal arena have affected the social make-up of Israel’s 
foreign policy elite. From the late 1990s Israel’s leadership increasingly has reflected the 
increased influence of societal actors such as businessmen, Shas and Israel Our Home, 
exemplified in the nomination of Avigdor Liemermann for Foreign Minister, all indicative of 
the trend towards the demise of the Ashkenazi, secular, nationalist male elite. This shift is the 
most significant change in the social make-up of Israel’s foreign policy-making since the 
victory of Likud in the 1977 elections.  
 
53  See Shlomo Ben-Ami, A Place For All (Tel-Aviv: Ha-Kibutz Ha-Meuchad, 1998), 336-
338.  
54 On this see Barak and Sheffer Op Cit; Yoram Peri, Generals in the Cabinet Room: How the 




Having looked at the changes in the range and impact of societal actors and the social make-
up of Israel’s foreign policy-making, I shall move to look at the contours shaping Israel’s 
foreign policy behaviour. On the one hand there is continuity with earlier phases. As in the 
past, the decisions and actions of Israel’s government have consistently been impacted by the 
security factor, as articulated by the IDF.55  At the same time, however, there have been 
changes in the contours the approaches defining Israel’s foreign relations.  
 
One stance privileges globalization and security as the key determinates of Israel’s foreign 
policy. Thus, Rabin’s and Peres’ decision to recognize the PLO and signing the Oslo 
agreements were inextricably linked to the perception that these steps would further embed 
Israel into political, military, and economic spheres of activity.56  Sharon, in turn, linked the 
unilateral withdrawal from Gaza with deepening Israel’s economic embeddedness in global 
frameworks and maintaining its political and military global standing. His comments at on 30 
June 2005, in a speech he delivered to an important annual gathering of Israel’s economic 
elite, the Caesarea Conference, are illuminating:  
 
55 The most cogent empirical account of this phenomenon remain Peri, Generals in the 
Cabinet Room, Op. Cit.  
56 For the global impulse in Rabin’s and Peres’s thinking see, Peres, The New Middle East, 
Op Cit.; Efraim Inbar, Rabin and Israel’s National Security, (Washington, DC: Woodrow 
Wilson Centre Press, 1999), 8-23, 84-113, 119-124, 137-139, and 159-163. For the impact of 
globalization on the Sharon government see Aran, Israel’s Foreign Policy towards the PLO, 
chapter 5 especially.   
26 
 
I believe that Disengagement will be one of the most successful, economically 
influential steps carried out in Israel. It is sufficient to examine the influence which 
the Disengagement has had on the growth of the Israeli economy even before it is 
carried out. I believe that your experts estimated that benefits of Disengagement at 2% 
GNP per annum. There is no doubt that the dramatic increase in tourism, foreign 
investment and consumption originate primarily in optimism in the political arena. It 
is no accident that in the past two years [since 2003] we have seen renewed growth 
and the return of foreign investors.57  
Unlike Rabin, Peres, and Sharon, Benjamin Netanyahu did not attribute much significance to 
the interrelationship between foreign policy change and globalization.  In A Place Among the 
Nations  ̧which is widely considered to be the blueprint of Netanyahu’s beliefs, he does not 
devote any attention to the interrelationships between foreign policy and globalization.58 
 
57 For Sharon’s speech see, 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/Israeli+Disengage
ment+Plan+20-Jan-2005.htm#39, accessed 16 September 2008.  Sharon made a similar 
argument meetings he had with the Israeli export forum and Israel’s manufactures 
association. See, respectively, 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Speeches+by+Israeli+leaders/2004/PM+Sharon+sp
eech+to+Conference+for+Advancement+of+Export+11-Nov-2004.htm, accessed 16 
September 2008; 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/Israeli+Disengage
ment+Plan+20-Jan-2005.htm#doc15., accessed 16 September 2008.    
58 Benjamin Netanyahu, A Place Among the Nations: Israel and the World (London: Bantam 
Press, 1993).  
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Also, when asked whether he shared Peres’ vision of a New and globalized Middle East, he 
replied that ‘the notion was characteristic of people who live under continuous siege and want 
to change what is happening beyond their walls by imagining a different reality’.59 Thus, 
rather than being propelled by a drive towards globalization, the first and second Netanyahu 
government were characterized by what might be termed as the ethnonationalism-security 
nexus. This factor was key in the first Nenayahu’s government’s efforts to unpick the Oslo 
Process. In Netanyahu’s second term, the ethnonationalism-security factor has been a central 
contributing factor to the ongoing stalemate with the Palestinians.60 
 
In some senses the rise of globalization as an influential factor in Israeli foreign policy, 
alongside the ongoing salience of ethno nationalism and declining statism, has not changed 
the role of Israeli secret diplomacy in the broader matrix of Israeli foreign policy. Employing 
secret diplomacy as a way to increase Israeli state capacity is as important today as it was 
during the previous periods examined by this chapter. However, the context in which it is 
employed is different in a number of ways. The combination of new means of technology and 
global media communications means that it is much more difficult than before to avoid 
decisions taken within government forums—inluding those referring to secret diplomacy—
from being leaked. The WikiLeakes episode mentioned in the Introduction to this book 
illustrates this point most clearly. Consequently, Israeli covert diplomacy has greater global 
 
59 Quoted in Shlaim, The Iron Wall, p. 574.  
60 For a good account of the first Netanyahu government see Neil Lochery, The Difficult 
Road to Peace (Reading: Itacha Press, 1999). The decision not to continue the settlement 
freeze in return for a very generous US offer epitomizes the affect of ethnonationalism in 
Netanyahu’s second term.  
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material implications than in erstwhile periods. The debates over whether or not Israel shall 
attack Iran, and the alleged covert diplomacy Israel is employing in this context—e.g., cyber 
attacks, assassinations, sabotaging Iranian installations—epitomize the trend of Israeli covert 
diplomacy ‘going global’. Concurrently, as the state has increasingly retreated from the 
erstwhile roles it played in the economy, society, and culture, covert diplomacy plays less of 
a role in Israeli identity formation than in the past. Other forces—religious, economic, 
ethnic—have encroached upon the salient place reserved for Israeli ‘secret operations’ in the 


















This paper proposes a historical-analytical approach to examine Israel’s foreign policy, based 
on the state, ethnonationalism and globalization as determinants of Israel’s foreign policy. 
We account for changes in Israel’s foreign policy by linking it to crises: the political-military 
crisis following the 1973 war, and the economic crisis faced by Israel in 1985. The degree of 
change is explored in relation to the nature and impact of societal actors on Israel’s foreign 
policy, the social make-up of the foreign policy elite, and shifts in the contours defining 
Israel’s foreign policy. Although this approach privileges the domestic over the external 
sphere, I justify this by acknowledging the significance afforded to domestic factors in 
determining how external change might be interpreted. The proposed approach is contrasted 
with the regional, domestic, and ideological approaches. The focused view presented in this 
paper does not examine Israel’s foreign policy in the same degree of detail as in these 
alternative stances. However, this limitation is perhaps compensated for by the benefits of the 
approach proposed in this paper in terms of breadth.  
 
In this context the it might be appropriate to conclude by emphasizing three contributions. 
First, the approach in this chapter emphasizes the rise of new actors in distinct historical 
periods and how their waxing and waning are linked to changes in the conflicting approaches 
to Israel’s foreign policy. Thus we saw how increasingly more domestic actors create inroads 
into Israel’s foreign policy-making, at the expense of the salience of the state. Second, the 
paper focused upon how to explain change and, in particular, the role of crises in shift in 
Israel’s foreign policy. The effects generated by the 1973 and 1985 crises were noted, 
respectively, in relation to the changing stances shaping the conduct of Israel’s foreign 
affairs. The concern for security has remained constant in Israel’s foreign policy. However, 
from the 1948-1973 activist-non activist debate to the 1973-1985 Hawk-Dove debates, and 
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from these to the debate on globalization vs. ethnonationlism, crises are at the heart of the 
changes this paper has examined. Thirdly, the paper proposed some reflections on the 
implications broader trends in Israeli foreign policy might have for the crafting and conduct 
of Israeli secret diplomacy. These included: the decline in the relative autonomy of the state’s 
ability to employ covert diplomacy; the changing context of the debates informing the 
crafting and conduct of Israel’s secret diplomacy; the diminishing role secret diplomacy plays 
in Israeli identity formation; and the increasingly global remit entailed by Israeli secret 
diplomacy. At the same time, Israeli secret diplomacy has exhibited consistency in terms of 
its importance for Israeli state capacity building.  
 
 
 
